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R&D and Merger Profitability 
Gamal Atallah * 
This paper analyzes the interaction between R&D and merger 
profitability. The industry is composed of symmetric filIns who 
undertake cost-reducing R&D and compete in output. A sub-
group of fiIlns merge. and all fi lII1S a매ust their R&D invest-
ments to the new market structure. It is found that In most 
cases R&D has a negligible impact on merger profitability. and 
does not change the critical number of finns required to make a 
merger profitable. However. when fin l1s are indifferent toward a 
merger in the absence of R&D. R&D has an effect on merger 
profitability. Noncooperative R&D makes such mergers profitable 
for low and high levels of spillovers. and unprofitable for 
inteIlllediate levels of spillovers; moreover. the range of spillovers 
such that a merger is unprofitable due to R&D increases with 
concentration. Cooperative R&D without infoI1l1ation sharing 
makes such mergers profitable for low spillovers. but unprofit-
able for high spillovers. Cooperative R&D with infoIll1ation 
sharing makes such mergers unprofitable. 
Keyωords: Mergers. Merger paradox. R&D. R&D cooperation. 
R&D spillovers 
JEL Class따cation: D43. Ll3. 033 
I. Introduction 
On the one hand. R&D investment is known to be a major engine 
of growth and economic 밍ld technolo밍C외 progress. On the other 
h없ld. mergers are known to have deep effects on the performance of 
markets. and often involve a tradeoff between allm찌ng firms to 
enhance their market power 없ld allowing them - and consumers - to 
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benefit from. increased efficiencies or network extemalities. Yet, 암le 
interaction between mergers and R&D is not well understood. What is 
the impact of mergers on R&D investments? And what is the impact 
of R&D on the private 없ld social profitability of mergers? This 
interaction , and the double caus외ity between R&D 와ld merger 
profitability, are the subject of the present paper. 
There e잉st large separate literatures on mergers and on R&D. On 
the theoretical side, there is a large literature on mergers. Of 
paπicular relevance to the current paper is the work related to merger 
profitability. Unless there are special circumstances or efficiency gains 
obtained by the merger. mergers by Cournot filIns -are often 
unprofitable , unless they include a large proportion of finlls in the 
industry.l The current paper will show how R&D contributes to this 
debate. 
The theoretical literature on R&D has addressed the effect of 
mergers , and has compared R&D cooperation with mergers (which 
entail cooperation at both the output 하ld R&D s떠ges). Brod and 
Shivakumar (1 997) analyze R&D cooperation with and without output 
cooperation , with both R&D coopera디on and collusion considered as 
exogenous. However. in their model R&D coopera디on and output 
collusion involve 외1 fi lIllS in the industry. leaving out the issue of the 
impact of R&D on merger profitability. Choi et al. (2003) 밍lalyze 
integra디on in a systems market and find that integration by the 
producer of a monopolized component into the competitive comple-
mentary component market may reduce R&D. Moreover. they analyze 
the incentives for integra디on. and find that the pπvate incentives may 
exceed the social incentives when R&D investment is in an 
intelIllediate r밍1ge. However. 삼le issue of merger profitability is 
addressed. 
1 Different mechanisms have been proposed throu맹 which fìIlllS can 
evade the merger paradox: Access to scarce capital (Peny 와ld Porter 1985); 
product differentiation with Bertrand compe디디on (Deneckere and Davidson 
1985); non-CouIIlot behavior (Kwoka 1989); capacity constraints (B허k 
1995); properties of the demand function (Fauli-Ol1er 1997; Hennessy 2000); 
the short run VS. the long run (P，이asky and Mason 1998); choice of product 
r밍1ge (Lommerud 밍ld SØrgard 1997); dynarnic CouIIlOt compe디디on 
(Dockner 와ld Gaunersdorfer 2001); open-loop vs. closed-loop strate밍es 
(Benchekroun 2003); improved infoIlllation flows inside the merged entity 
(Huck et 띠. 2004); intra-fiI IIl coordination 떠igl 없ld Welzel 2005); and 
setting compe디디on between the internal divisiolls of the merged firm 
(Creane and Davidson 2004). 
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The emp1rical. literature has focused on the effect of mergers on 
R&D. The evidence on the impact of mergers on R&D investments is 
mixed. Mergers improved technologic외 perform없lce ín. the American 
computer industry (Hagedoorn and Duysters 2000) and in the 
chemícal índustry (Arora et al. 2000). However, Bertrand 없ld Zuníga 
(2004) find that in OECD countries , domestic mergers tend to depress 
R&D ínvestments , while cross-border mergers have a positive effect 
on R&D. Cassiman et al. (2005) find that mergers .involving rivals 
reduce R&D , while mergers inv이ving non-rivals boost R&D .. Blonigen 
and Taylor (2000) find that in the U.5. electronic and electric 
equipment sector, there is a negative relationship between .R&D 
intensity and the propensity to. merge. The effect .in. the other 
direction, from R&D (and spillovers) to merger profitabili양， is not 
addressed in either the theoretical or empirical literatures. 
To analyze the interaction between mergers and R&D , we set up a 
model of Cournot competition where firms invest in cost-reducing 
R&D , and where R&D spillovers. are present. In a two-stage 
framework , firms invest in R&D in the fírst stage and compete in 
output in the second stage. Any mergers , if they take place , occur 
prior to the R&D stage. The focus of the paper is on how the presence 
of R&D affects merger profitability. That ís , does the presence of R&D 
investments make mergers more or less profitable, compared to a 
market where. R&D ís not present. Three types of interactions ín R&D 
are considered: R,&D competition, R&D cooperation without infor-
mation sharing, and R&D coopera디on with information sharing. 
Regard1ng the effect of mergers on R&D , 1t is found that mergers 
tend to reduce R&D investments and realized cost reduction by the 
merged entity. When spillovers are hígh , however , the merger may 
increase R&D investment by the mergíng firms. AB for the effect of 
R&D on merger profitability, in most cases , surprisingly, R&D has no 
effect on merger profitabiliψ. That is , for most possible mergers , if a 
merger is profitable (unprofitable) in a market without R&D , it will 
also be profítable (unprofitable) in a market with R&D. This is due to 
the fact that for most mergers , R&D effects are negligible relative to 
output effects. Hence, whether they reinforce them or mitigate them , 
they do not change whether the merger is profitable or not. 
An interes디ng result obtains concerning the mergers which were 
neíther profítable nor unprofitable in the absence of R&D: Mergers 
which made finns indifferent between undertaking them or not. For 
all such mergers , it is shown that with noncooperative R&D present, 
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those mergers become strictly profitable when spillovers are low or 
hi양1. 와1d strictly unprofitable when spillovers are intennediate. The 
intuition behind this result is that the profitability of a merger in the 
presence of R&D depends. through mar，밍nal costs 밍1d outputs. on 
how the merger affects R&D investments. While in all such mergers 
the merged en디ty contracts its R&D and outsiders exp밍1d their R&D. 
the impact of these changes in R&D investments on finIls' competi디ve 
positions depends on spillovers. The e지pansion of R&D investments 
by outsiders hurts the merged entity when sp피overs are low. but 
benefits it when spillovers are high. At the same time. even 암10U양1 
삼1e merged en다ty reduces its R&D investment. the spillover rate is 
perfect within the finn. hence. for a 밍ven R&D investment. 삼1e 
realized cost reduction is higher. And even though 삼1e realized cost 
reduction is lower than before the merger. the finn ’s output is lower. 
hence it is rational to invest less in R&D and achieve less cost 
reduction. This results in the fl이10뼈ng effects on the merged en디ty. 
When spillovers are low. the gain from this improved diffusion is 
important, 없1d the contraction in R&D benefits the merged entity. 
When spillovers are high. the benefit from this improved diffusion is 
lower. 없1d the contraction hurts the merged en디ty. Moreover. the 
r밍1ge of spillovers where mergers are unprofitable is larger. the more 
concentrated the market is. 
This results in three spillover ranges: Profitable mergers for low 
sp피overs. where the positive effect of improved diffusion dominates 
the loss from the R&D expansion by outsiders; unprofitable mergers 
with intenIlediate spillovers. where the nega디ve effect of contraction 
dominates the positive effect obtained through 야le R&D expansion by 
outsiders; and profitable mergers with high spillovers. where the 
benefit from outsiders' R&D expansion dominates the loss from R&D 
contraction by the merged en디ty. 
π1e model is 외so extended to coopera디ve R&D. It is sho찌π1 삼lat 
cooperative R&D without infonnation sharing makes mergers (toward 
which finlls are indifferent in the absence of R&D) profitable for low 
spillovers. but unprofitable for high spillovers. On the other hand. 
coopera디ve R&D with infOI mation sharing makes such mergers 
unprofitable. 
The next section presents and solves the model. Section III analyzes 
the effects of mergers on R&D. effective cost reduction. and welfare. 
Section IV. which constitutes the core of the paper. presents 야1e 
results on merger profitability under noncoopera디ve and cooperative 
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R&D. Some extensions of the model are discussed in section v.. 
Section VI concIudes and discusses the implications of the results. 
11. The Model 
n>2 finns producing a homogeneous good compete a la Coumot. 
Demand is given by p=A-bY, where Y denotes total industry output. 
The g밍ne has two stages. In the first stage, firms invest in 
cost-reducing R&D. In the second stage, firms produce and sell their 
output. The number of finns is exogenous. 




n ” ( 
where Xi denotes the R&D investment of firm í. FiI m í benefits from 
R&D investments of other finns through the spillover rate βε [0 , 1]. 
Y is an R&D efficiency parameter: The higher y. the less efficient 
is R&D , 없ld the harder it is to reduce mar.핑nal costs. Profits are 
given by 
πi=(P-Ci )Yi-Xi (2) 
Solving the output stage yields the output of firm í for a given 
margin외 cost: 
Yi= 
A- nCi+ LJ"'i Cj 
b(n+ 1) 
(3) 
Substitu다ng this output into (2) and s이ving for the symmetric 
equilib찌um in R&D yields the R&D investmerit of each finn: 
(A- α)(n(l- β1+ β) 
(4) X ,= 
‘ β2+by+ β(bY-l)+n[2by+2β(by+l)-2β2 -lJ+n2[b y+ β(by-l)+ β2] 
Obvious1y, me R&D investment of each firm depends on n , and 
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mergers, by chàn!핑ng n, will affect R&D. 
Let msn firms merge and fOllu one fillll. The number of active 
fiI IIlS fol1o뼈ng the merger is n - m + 1. Hence. after 야le merger, each 
active fillll will produce output and invest in R&D based on (3) and 
(4) , but with n replaced by n-m+ l. 
Let πi(Z) represent the profit of fillll i when there are z fillns in the 
market. Before the merger, each fiIlIl was making πi(n). After the 
merger, each fiIIn is m와dng π‘(n-m+ 1). πlis is because when m 
fiI IIlS merge 윈ld fOIlIl one fiIlll. the number of fiIlIlS in the industIy is 
reduced by m - l. The profits made by the merging fi IlIlS prior to the 
merger are mπi(n). The merger is profitable iff 
mπ(n) 드 ;r(n-m+ 1) (5) 
where the subscript i is dropped for notational convenience. The 
complexity of the analytical solutions for R&D and profits makes it 
impossible to 밍lalyze merger profitab피tyan외ytic외ly. Hence. the 
paper will rely on numerical simulations.2 None of the results 
depend on the specific par없neter values used. The crucial para-
meters for the analysis are n. m. 없ld β. 
111. The 얹fect of Mergers 
In this section the effect of mergers on R&D. realized cost reduction 
and welfare is analyzed. The go외 of this section is to prepare the 
ground for section rv. Hence the results do not necessarily hold for 외I 
market structures nor for 외1 possible mergers. 
Consider first how the merger affects R&D investments. Consider 
the merger with n=5 and m=4.3 Figure 1 illustrates the R&D 
investment of each fiIlIl before and after the merger. Each fiI'IIl invests 
more in R&D. because concentration has increased and the size of 
each fiIIIl has increased. As Figure 2 illustrates. this results in less 
total R&D investment 4 for low / inteIIllediate spillovers. but hi양ler 
2 The follo뼈ng parame떠zation is used throughout the paper: A = 2000. 
b= 1. a=75. y=30. 
3 The relevance of tl꾀s merger will become clear in the next section. 
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total R&D investrnent for high spillovers. Intuitiv애. spillovers have 
more negative incentive effects on innovation in a noncoopera디ve 
environment when the number of compe디tors is large. Hence total 
R&D investrnent declines more steeply with spillovers before the 
merger than after. This explains why the merger reduces total R&D 
investment for low spillovers. but increases it for hi양1 spillovers. 
Effective cost reduction per finll. which represents the dollar 
anlOunt by which the mar밍n려 production cost is reduced. is defined 
as 
q‘= 
Xj+ ßL.}"j xj 
Y 
(6) 
Figure 3 shows that each fil m now e띠oys more cost reduction. 
because the finn is larger. invests more in R&D. and benefits from 
the hi향ler R&D investments of the other finlls. This means that 
the industry is now opera디ng with lower mar;핑nal costs. albeit at a 
higher degree of concentration. However. as Figure 4 shows. there 
is less total cost reduction5 in the industry: πle increase in per 
finn R&D and efl농ctive cost reduction does not compensate for 야le 
fact that there are less fin l1s in the industry. As Figure 5 shows. 
total welfare 6 is reduced by the merger. It is easy to verify that 
consumer surplus is 외so reduced. 
Until now comparisons have been made between variables 
concelning one finn prior to the merger and one finll after 암le 
merger. However. the relevant comparison for perfonuance 킹ld 
profitability is between the investments and perfonnancε of the group 
of mer핑ng fil Il1S prior to the merger. with the investments and 
perfonnance of the fiI m that results from the merger. Figure 6 
compares R&D investments by the merged finns before and after. 
Total R&D investments of the merged fin l1s are lower before than 
after the merger. except for high spillovers. There is now less R&D 
competi디on. and the output of the merged finlls has declined. hence 
the optimal level of R&D is lower for most levels of spillovers. For very 
high spillovers. however. R&D was low ini디려ly because of the large 
number of fin l1s prior to the merger and the strong disincentive from 
、 ‘ 
5 Total cost reduction is given by Q = r'. i.qi. 
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high spillovers , hence R&D increases with the merger. Figuré 7 shows 
that the merging finn enjoys less cost reduction after than before the 
merger. 
IV. The Profitability of Mergers 
We are now ready to analyze 야le profitability of mergers. In the 
absence of R&D , Salant et al. (1983) have shown that m must be Iarge 
enough relative to n (at least 80%) for a merger to be profitable. Here 
we w없lt to inquire how the presence of R&D affects this threshold. 
We first consider noncooperative R&D , and then analyze the effect of 
cooperative R&D on merger profitability. 
A. R&D Competition 
It turns out that in most cases , the presence of R&D has no effect 
on 감le critical profitabiliψ threshold. That is , for most market 
structures 없ld for most mergers , a merger that is profitable 
(unprofitable) in the absence of R&D will also be profitable 
(unprofitable) in the presence of R&D. 
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CR!TICAL 1님RESHOWS WπH AND WπHOlIT R&D 
(n= lOJ 
To illustrate this result. consider the market structure n = 10. Let 
TTlC represent the critical threshold for profitability in the absence of 
R&D. and let 1T냉 represent the critic외 threshold with R&D present. In 




We now wish to compare 따 with rn:. It is not possible to solve 
explicitly for m~. Rather. we parame띠ze the model and plot is as a 
function of β. Figure 8 illustrates both 따 and rn: when n= 10. It 
is clear that the presence of R&D does not affect merger profit-
abi때. While R&D 짧ects the critical threshold. that is. TTlc>=~. 
because n has to be 없1 integer. this ch킹1ge is of no consequence. 
Hence. in the absence of R&D. 8.2 films are required to make a 
merger profitable. Wíth R&D present. slightly less (moreJ finns are 
required when spillovers are low or high (intennediate). The reason 
for thís will become clear shortly. However. the change in the 
critical threshold is of second order. and hence the integer 
threshold has not really changed: A merger between 8 or less fin Ils 
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is not profitable , while a merger between 9 or more finns is 
profitable. In that sense, in a case like this; while technicaIIy the 
presence of R&D ch없1ges 야le. criticaI. threshold , the result is 
economicaIly the s없ne as, without R&D. 
The reason why in most cases R&D does not ch하1ge 삼le 
conditions for merger profitability is that the change in profits due 
to R&D is too smaIl relative to the change in profits due to 
changes in output. For instance , when ~ < 111c, R&D enhances the 
profitabili앙 of the merger sli향1tly (because now Iess finlls are 
needed to make the merger profitable). Similarly, when m~ > 111c, 
R&D reduces the profitability of the merger. But these changes are 
too small to 앙fect the sign of the inequ려ity in (5). When the 
(integer) threshold. is unchanged by the presence of R&D , this 
means 상lat the magnitude of the net effect, irrespective of its sign , 
is too small to reverse merger profitabili양/unprofitability. 
The only cases where the presence of R&D will have an effect on 
merger profitabili양 is when , in the absence of R&D , firms were 
indifferent between merging 없ld .not merging, that is , when 
mπ(n)= π(n-m+ 1) (8) 
In that case , even a slight change in the cri디cal threshold , due to 
the presence of R&D , can make the merger profitable or unprof-
itable. In such cases , we can say that R&D affects the profitability 
of mergers. 
Table 1 illustrates the initiaI number of firms such that l11c is an 
integer. For instance , with n=5 , a merger between 4 finns does not 
change the profits of the merged finlls when there is no R&D. This 
applies to 려1 other niergers in the table. The last column of Table 1 
will be discussed below. 
To analyze how R&D affects the profitability of such mergers , we 
focus on the merger of 4 firms when n=5. The anaIysis applies to aIl 
other mergers illustrated in Table 1. Figure 9 illustrates the criticaI 
thresholds with and without R&D when n=5. The presence of R&D 
Iowers the threshold when spillovers are low or high , but raises it 
when spillovers are intermediate. This means that a merger of 4 finns 
becomes strtctly profitable for low or high spillovers, and strictly 
unprofitable for intermediate spillovers. Figure 10 illustrates the prè 
and post-merger profits with n=5 and m=4. The merger is profitable 
iff β드 0.5 or β르 0.83. 
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TA파æl 
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We decompose the change in profitability into 따o effects. Let x앙 
represent total R&D investment of the merged firms before the 
merger. and x~ represent total R&D investment of the me땅ed fillIlS 
after the merger. Similarly. let x~ represent total R&D investment of 
the non-merged firms before the merger. and x~ represent total R&D 
investment of the non-merged firms after the merger. The ch하1ge in 
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PROFITS OF MERGING FIRMS 
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First, there is the effect of 야le change in R&D by the merged firms , 
h이ding the R&D of outsiders constant. This effect is given by EM= 
π{X~， X잉-mπ(X앙， X~). Second, there is the effect of the increase in 
R&D of outsiders on the profits of the merged finns. πlis effect is 
given by EN. Figure 11 plots EM. EN and their sum (which repre-
sents the change in profits of the merged films) in the case n= 5 , 
m=4. Consistent with Figure 10, Figure 11 shows that. this merger 
is profitable when β드 0.5 or β므 0.83. 없ld is unprofitable in the 
range βε(0.5 ， 0.83). Hence. the merger is profitable for low or high 
spillovers, but unprofitable for intermediate spillovers. 
To understand this result, we look at the decomposition of the 
change in profits. Consider first EM. Figure 11 shows that EM first 
declines and then increases with spi1lovers. Moreover , EM>O for 
β<0.5 and EM<O for β>0.5. 
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To understand this effect. note that the contraction in R&D a[fects 
the profits of the merged fin I1s throu맹 three channels. First. it has a 
direct nega다ve effect on profits. since the reduction increases their 
mar핑n외 cost. Second. the merger implies that the spillover rate 
inside the merged entity is perfect: heI1ce. for a given level of R&D. 
삼1e merger increases the effective cost reduction of the merged fin I1S. 
This effect increases profits. and is more important when sp피overs 
are low. because in this case the change in the intemal spillover rate 
is most significant. Third. the contraction in R&D by the merged filIus 
increases the production cost of outsiders. since 삼1ey benefit less 
from diffusion of the R&D of the merged fin I1s. for a 핑ven spillover 
rate. πlis third effect is most significant when spillovers are hi양1. 
because it is in this case that the reduction in R&D by the merged 
fi lII1S hurts outsiders most. When β is close to 1. the merged en디ty 
actually exp밍1ds its R&D (see Figure 6). but exp하lsion in this case is 
not very beneficial. because it benefits outsiders considerably. 
EM declines with spillovers up to β =0.802 because in this range 
the benefit from the increase in the intemal spillover rate (the first 
effect) is reduced: it increases with spillovers when β>0.802 (even 
though it is nega디ve in this range) because in this r없1ge the benefit 
from the increase in the produc디on cost of outsiders increases with 
spillovers. 
More import밍ltly. EM> 0 for β<0.5. In this range. the reduction in 
R&D by the merged fir Ills actually benefits them. Remember that the 
merged en디ty is smaller than the sum of the fir IIlS prior to the 
merger. hence the op디mal level of R&D for it has declined. In this 
r하1ge. the benefit from adjusting the size of R&D. and from the 
increase in the intemal spillover rate. makes the reduction in R&D 
profitable. When β>0.5. however. EM<O. In this r，와1ge. the benefit 
from the increase in the intemal spillover rate is less important. and 
the loss from R&D contraction dominates. 
Consider next the effect of the increase in R&D by outsiders. EN. As 
Figure 11 shows. this effect always increases with spillovers: The 
merged entity benefits more from this exp없lsion. the higher is β. 
Moreover. EN<O for β<0.5 하1d EN>O for β> 0.5. Hence the effect on 
insiders is positive when spillovers are sufficiently high. 
The total change in the profitability of the merger (remember that in 
the absence of R&D 야1is merger induced a zero change in the profits 
of the merged fir IllS) is given by the sum L1π= EM + EN • and is shown 
in Figure 11. When β< 0.5. the I1et effect is positive: in 야1is range 
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DECOMPOSITION OF THE CHANGE IN THE PROFITS OF THE MERGING FIRMS 
(n=5. m=4) 
EM>O and EN<O; hence EM dominates: The benefit from adjusting 
R&D and increasing 삼le intemal spillover rate dominates the loss 
from the expansion of R&D by outsiders. When βE (0.5. 0.83). the net 
effect is negative. In this range EM<O but EN>O: The loss from own 
R&D reduction dominates the gain from the R&D expansion by 
outsiders. Finally. when β> 0.83. the net effect is positive. In this 
range. even though EM<O and EN>O. the effect of EN dominates: The 
benefit from the R&D expansion by outsiders dominates the loss from 
the reduction of own R&D (or the loss from R&D expansion when β is 
close to 1). 
The last column of Table 1 illustrates the range of unprofitability 
for all mergers affected by R&D. for n< 100. The lower bound is 
always β=0.5. 하ld the upper bound declines with competi디on. As 
the number of firms in the industry increases (prior to the merger). 
EN. the benefit from the expansion of R&D by outsiders - positive 
when spillovers are hígh -. increases. making the merger profitable for 
a wider range of spillovers. i.e. pushing 상le upper bound of the 
unprofitabili양 r없1ge to the left. 
The following proposition summanzes the effect of noncooperative 
R&D on merger profitability. 
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Proposition 1 
Consider 와1 industIy composed of n fU II1s. where the merger of m 
finns leaves the profits of the merged filIllS unch원1ged in the absence 
of R&D. with m an integer. Then. in the presence of R&D. this merger 
becomes strictly profitable when β<0.5 or β> β:c. and sσictly 
unprofitable for βE(0.5.βCl. wi삼1 βcE (0.5.1). Moreover. β:c declines 
with n. (See Table 1 for exact values of β:c for n < 100). 
B. R&D CarteUzation 
Consider now how the presence of coopera디ve R&D 와fects merger 
profitability. Everytl파19 is as above. except that now R&D expen버­
tures are detelInined cooperatively. whether there is a merger or not. 
For now we focus on R&D cartelization. where fil rns choose R&D 
expe띠itures to maxiu꾀ze joint profits but the spillover rate is 
unaffected by R&D coopera디on. Moreover. even when a group of fU II1s 
merge. 삼le new entity continues to cooperate with outsiders. The 
impact of rela엉ng 삼lis assumption will be discussed later. 
Under coopera디on. R&D is given by 
Xic= 
IA- 예((n -1) β+ 1) 
(n+ 1)2(by- β2)+ β[b y(n2 + 1) +2n(b y -1) +2)-1 
(10) 
It tums out that even with cooperative R&D. in most cases 삼le 
profitability of mergers is not affected by the presence of R&D: A 
merger 삼1at is strictly (un)profitable without R&D remains so in the 
presence of cooperative R&D. What is of interest. as in the pre찌ous 
section. is how mergers toward which finlls are indifferent in the 
absence of R&D. are affected by 바le presence of cooperative R&D. 
Given that a paπi려 list of such mergers is given in Table 1. here we 
focus the analysis on the case where n=5 and m=4. The s밍ne 
analysis can be applied to 외1 other mergers in Table 1. 
Figure 12 illustfates the impact of such a merger on R&D invest-
ment of the mer횡ng filIllS. The merger reduces R&D investment by 
those filIllS. 킹ld the reduction increases with spillovers. When 
spillovers are low. the reduction in R&D is smaller because the 
mer밍ng fil rns gain from the increased spillover rate between them. 
and this effect is important in spite of the reduction of the size of the 
merged filIllS 없ld their ouφut. With high spillovers. however. the 
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value of this increased internal spillover rate is reduced. hence R&D 
declines more sharply. 
Figure 13 shows the effect of the merger on the R&D of the 
outsider. 7 The outsider increases its R&D. and this increase is most 
substantial when spillovers are low. Note that cooperative R&D is 
hardly sensitive to spillovers when n=2. and very sensitive to 
spillovers at n=5. In fact, the sensiti띠ty of cooperative R&D to 
spillovers is non-monotonic in n: It starts veπ low at n=2. reaches a 
peak at n=5. and declines afterwards (see Figure 14). The sensiti띠양 
is initially low because a low n means limited benefits from diffusion. 
As the number of firms increases. the benefits of diffusion increase. 
hence dX/ dβ increases. As n increases further. however. the size of 
each firm is reduced. and the benefits of diffusion are more limited. 
hence the coopera디ve R&D of each firm increases less steeply V\끼th 
spillovers. In consequence. (going back to Figure 13) the increase in 
R&D is most important when spillovers are low; as spillovers in-
crease. R&D increases less steeply after the merger than before the 
7 There is only one outsider left when n=5 and m=4. 
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merger, hence the increase is 1ess important for high spillovers. A 
similar exp1ana디on can 외so be used to exp1ain the change in R&D by 
insiders illustrated in Figure 12. 
The result that the decline in R&D by the merged firms increases 
with spillovers ho1ds for any market structure in Tab1e 1. However, 
the result that the increase in R&D by outsiders decreases wi삼1 
spillovers is 1ess robust: It is reversed for very high va1ues of m and n 
in Tab1e 1. However. all the other resu1ts. in par디cu1ar merger profi-
tability. continue to hold. The reason is, as we will see. is that the 
effects - on merger profitability - of the change in own R&D dominate 
the effects of the ch없1ge in the R&D of outsiders. 
Consider now the effect of the merger on the profits of the merged 
firms. As Figure 15 illustrates. 야1e merger of 4 finns in a 5-fiIIn 
industry performing cooperative R&D both before and after the merger 
is strictly profitab1e for β<0.5 and strictly unprofitable for β>0.5. To 
understand this result. the same decomposition that was used for 
noncooperative R&D is applied to cooperative R&D (see Equation (9) 
above). Figure 16 illustrates the decomposition for cooperative R&D. 
EM represents the effect of the change in R&D of the merged firms on 
profits , holding the outsiders' R&D constant. This effect is positive for 
β<0.5 ， 밍1d nega디ve for β> 0.5. Remember that the merged finns 
reduce their R&D following the merger. This in itself has a nega디ve 
effect on their profits. However, even though there is no information 
sharing. 삼1e merged fírms now use a single research lab. hence the 
implicit spillover rate within the firm is 1. For low enough spillovers, 
the gain from this improved internal spillovers dominates the loss 
from the reduction in R&D. and EM>O. Moreover. the reduction in 
R&D by the merged finns is at its lowest when spillovers are low (see 
Figure 12). hence the direct loss from this reduction is also negligible. 
For β>0.5， however. the gain from improved internal spillovers is less 
import없1t. and the merged firms lose from the reduction of their 
R&D , hence EM<O. Moreover, the reduction in the merged finns' R&D 
is largest when spillovers are high. which reinforces this loss. 
As for the effect of the R&D expansion by outsiders on the merged 
films. it is negative (EN<이 when β<0.5， because the merged firms do 
not benefit sufficiently from this expansion. Moreover, this expansion 
is at its highest when spillovers are low. which hurts the merged 
finns even more. For high spillovers (β>0.5). however. the gain to the 
merged firms is substantial, and hence EN> O. Moreover, the expan-
sion of R&D by the outsider decreases with spillovers. 
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The net effect on profits depends on the magnitudes of these two 
effects. As Figure 16 shows. IEMI 르 IENI for all β. hence the own-effect 
dominates. and s땅n L1 π =signEM. 
Proposition 2 
Consider an industry composed of n finns. where the merger of m 
finns leaves the profits of the merged firms unchanged in the absence 
of R&D. with m an integer. Then. in the presence of R&D car-
telization. this merger becomes strictly profitable when β <0.5 and 
strictly unprofitable when β>0.5. 
Compared wi야1 noncoopera디ve R&D. R&D cartelization actually 
makes mergers unprofitable more often. Both cooperative and non-
cooperative R&D have in common that they make mergers profitable 
for β<0.5. and unprofitable in the range βε(0.5.βc). However. 
whereas noncooperative R&D makes mergers profitable in the range 
βε [ βc .1]. in this range cooperative R&D makes mergers unprofitable. 
C. RJV Cartelization 
Consider now the case of another m멍or type of R&D cooperation. 
RJV cartelization. where firms fully share their research results. in 
addition to coordinating their R&D expenditures. The R&D invest-
ments in this case are obtained by substituting β= 1 into (1이. Hence. 
RJV cartelization is equivalent to R&D cartelization with perfect 
spillovers. But above it was shown that a merger toward which firms 
are indifferent in the absence of R&D is strictly unprofitable in the 
presence of R&D cartelization for β>0.5. Hence such a merger 
becomes strictly unprofitable under RJV cartelization. Such a merger 
is unprofitable because it induces a decIine in R&D by the merged 
finlls without any improvement in the internal spillover rate (because 
all research results were shared even before the merger). This effect 
dominates the gain from the expansion of R&D by outsiders (i.e. IEMI 
> IENI at β= 1; see Figure 16). 
Proposition 3 
Consider an industry composed of n firms. where the merger of m 
finlls leaves the profits of the merged firms unchanged in the absence 
of R&D. wi삼1 m an integer. Then. in 삼le presence of RJV cartelization. 
this merger is unprofitable. 
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Comparing the effect of coopera디ve vs. noncooperative R&D on 
merger profitabili양. we can see tha1 the range of spillovers (which 
depends on ßC) detelluining (un)profitability depends on market 
structure for noncooperative R&D. bu1 is independent of marke1 
structure for coopera다ve R&D (both under R&D cartelization and RJV 
cartelization) . 
V. Extensions 
It is useful to test how the results derived above would respond 10 
different assump디ons about the type of R&D coopera디on and about 
fillll behavioT. ln this section we briefly consider three ex1ensions: The 
behavior of the merged entity fo11o때ng the merger. the combination of 
cooperative and noncoopera디ve R&D. 킹ld efficiency g려ns. 
A. Non-C∞peratiDn by Merged Ent때 
ln some cases. 삼le merged finns may prefer 10 s10p cooperating 
with outsider(s) fo11owing the merger. That is. they may now have the 
skills and resources necessary for them to perfonn R&D indepen-
dently. But according to the model above. such behavior will reduce. 
없ld c밍mot increase. merger profitability. π1is is because adopting a 
noncoopera디ve behavior fi이1m찌ng the merger will reduce the post-
merger profits. because R&D coopera디on always increases profits 
when finns are symmeσic. which is the case here. Hence. such 
behavior will make the merger even more unprofitable for β>0.5. 밍ld 
will create a range with low spillovers such that the merger becomes 
strictly unprofitable (while it was strictly profitable in the presence of 
R&D cartelization before and after the merger). 
B. Si11lultaneous Investment in C∞)perative and Noncooperative 
R&D 
Firms perfoIlIl both cooperative and noncoopera디ve R&D simul-
taneously (see Ata11ah (2004). Goyal et 띠. (2004)). 까le ques디on is: 
How would the presence of both types of R&D - before and af1er the 
merger - alter the resul1s derived above? 
The model provides us with enough infonnation 10 detelllline how 
the results would change in the presence of both noncoopera디ve 하ld 
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cooperative R&D for most spillover levels. Assume that copperative 
R&D takes the form of R&D cartelization (no information sharin밍. For 
ß<0.5 , both cooperative and noncooperative R&D contribute to 
making the merger profitable; hence the merger becomes. profitable 
with both types of R&D present. For βE(0.5， βc) ， both types of R&D 
contribute to making 바le merger unprofitable. hence the merger 
would be unprofitable in this spillover r없1ge. For β> ßc , noncooper-
ative R&D makes the merger profitable, while cooperative R&D has 
the opposite effect. The net impact on merger profitability depends on 
which effect dominates. If cooperative and noncooperative R&D were 
of appro잉mately equ외 magnitudes‘ the change in profits given by 
Figures 11 and 16 would give the correct magnitudes of ch없1ges in 
profits. Frorn those figures we can see that the loss from the presence 
of cooperative R&D is larger than the gain from the presence of 
noncoopera디ve R&D. Hence the merger should become unprofitable 
in the range βE(βc ,1) with both types of R&D present. However, 
there is no guarantee that investments in both types of R&D will be of 
equ외 magnitudes. Atallah (2004) 없1려lyzes a model where firms invest 
simultaneously in both types of R&D , 와ld finds that the share of 
cooperative R&D in total R&D increases with spillovers, hence we can 
expect the level of cooperative R&D to be higher than the level of 
noncooperative R&D in the range βE(β:c ， I). This asymmetry con-
tributes even more strongly to the unprofitability of the merger in this 
spillover range , as the negative effect of coopera다ve R&D on merger 
profitability will dominate even more. 
The impact of R&D on merger profitability is more difficult to 
predict without explicitly writing the model when finns perform both 
낀rpes of R&D and R&D cooperation takes the fOU11 of RJV car-
telization (R&D coordination combined with information sharing). 
Remember that RJV cartelization always contributes negatively to 
merger profitabili함. For β<0.5， noncooperative R&D contrtbutes 
positively. and the net effect is ambiguous. For βε(0.5 ， βc) ， both types 
of R&D make the merger unprofitable, and hence the net effect on 
merger profitability will be negative. Fin외ly. for βε{β'c ， l). the two 
types of R&D affect profitability in opposite directions , and the net 
effect is ambiguous (although Figures 11 and 16 su앓est that the 
negative effect of cooperative R&D is larger than the posi디ve effect of 
noncooperative R&D). 
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C. 뀔1Jìciency Gains 
In some cases mergers may induce efficiency gains ,8 which increase 
their profitability. In such cases the mergers induce 9 와1 exp없lsion 
rather than a contraction of the ouφut of the merged finlls. This 
expansion in ouφut would be par외leled by an increase in R&D. The 
merger would then have two benefits: The ‘ exogenous" efficiency 
effect. 없ld the endogenous change in R&D (in addition to the increase 
in the implicit intemal sp피over rate). When output 없ld R&D 
expenditures are strategic substitutes between fiIlIlS. and the 
efficiency g밍n is sufficiently important to the output and R&D of 
insiders. this should induce an output contraction and a reduction in 
삼le R&D of outsiders. In this case. 삼le presence of R&D - either 
coopera디ve or non-coopera디ve - is expected to increase merger profi-
tab피ty. 
VI. Conclusions 
This paper has analyzed the effect of R&D on merger profitability. It 
was shown that in most cases R&D has no effect on merger 
profitability. For a few mergers. however. which made fiIlus indifferent 
in the absence of R&D. R&D has an effect on merger profitability. 
Noncooperative R&D makes such mergers strictly profitable when 
spillovers are low or high. and strictly unprofitable when spillovers 
are inteIluediate. This is due to the interplay of the effect of changes 
in R&D by insiders and outsiders on the profits of the merged fiIlIlS. 
Cooperative R&D without infOI IIlation sharing makes such mergers 
profitable for low spillovers. but unprofitable for high spillovers. As for 
cooperative R&D with infOI mation sha디ng. it was shown to make 
such mergers unprofitable. 
The results of this paper enrich the large literature on merger 
profitability. Most of the contrtbutions to this literature have intro-
duced factors which make mergers profitable more often. Here it is 
shown that R&D has a complex effect on merger profitability. In most 
cases R&D does not 하fect merger profitability. And in the few cases 
where it does affect it. it can affect it either way. even for a given 
market structure 밍ld a given number of merged fiIlIlS , depending on 
8 See Perry and Porter (1 985). 
9 When the efficiency gain is import킹lt enough. 
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the spillover rate and 야le type of interaction in R&D. 
The prediction of the model of a negative impact of mergers on R&D 
- except for high spillovers - is. at a general leveI. consistent with the 
empirical evidence presented by Bertrand and Zuniga (2004) , who find 
that domestic mergers tend to depress R&D , and Cassiman et al. 
(2005) , who find that mergers involving rivals have the same effect. 
The mergers studied in this paper are domestic , and involve rivals. 
Should mergers in high-tech industries receive a special antitrust 
treatment? This paper does not suggest that mergers in high-tech 
industries , where R&D is more prevalent, deserve a more lenient 
treatment than those in more traditional industries. Even with the 
increase in the intemal spillover rate , which was present in this paper 
and which represents a reduction in duplication and an increase in 
R&D efficiency, mergers were found to be socially harmful. The 
answer may well be different in industries characterized by network 
effects or system markets , and this issue has been addressed 
elsewhere. 10 But the simple presence of R&D in a market does not 
make mergers socially beneficial. Interestingly, these mergers may 
become privately profitable due to the presence of R&D even though 
they are not efficiency enhancing, and are often even efficiency 
decreasing. Any such merger proposal would have to document the 
presence of efficiency gains in production or in research costs to be 
achieved by the merger. Otherwise , the welfare effects of such 
mergers are very similar to those obtained in more traditional 
markets. 
While in the current model R&D affects merger profitability only in 
the few cases where finns are indifferent between merging or not in 
the absence of R&D , R&D may tum out to be relevant for merger 
profitability in a much larger number of cases. On the one hand , 
there may be efficiency gains related to research productivity, in 
which case R&D will obviously enhance merger profitability. On the 
other hand , there may be other factors which increase the number of 
mergers such that finns are indifferent in the absence of R&D; for 
instance , fixed merger costs may make otherwise profitable Cournot 
mergers unprofitable at the margin , leaving a role for R&D in 
detennining merger profitability; or, there may be efficiency gains 
related to production which make otherwise unprofitable Coumot 
mergers profitable, again increasing the importance of R&D in 
10 See. for example. Economides and White (1994) and Choi et a l. (2003). 
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determining merger profitab피ty at the mar，핑n. 
Many questions remain unanswered by the model which should be 
seen as opp아tuni디es for future research. The use of more gener외 
cost and demand functions would allow us to verit)r that the results 
hold in more gener려 set피19S. Above it was assumed that only one 
co외ition of merging finlls fOllllS; more generally. several coalitions of 
mer핑ng finns may fonll. with each coalition consolidating the R&D 
activities of its members. Finally. fillIlS may be engaged in different 
양pes of R&D activities (product innovation. process innovation. basic 
research. etc.) simultaneously. in which case a merger will affect the 
composition. as well as the total level. of R&D investments. 
(Rec.잉ved 2 May 2005: Revised 26 October 2005) 
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